2015 Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Submission for Inquiry into Australian Airport Security
The escalating, changed safety and security environment is the challenge for Australia and the nation’s airport security!
The Government has responsibility for providing safety and security for its people.
Australia’s current safety and security model suffers from the “Pike Syndrome” and does not address the new and changing safety and security environment for Australia. It is stovepipe, now outdated, does not pool and use all resources available; not fully inclusive or fully integrated.
The radicalisation of individuals or groups; enhanced use of online communications to radicalise individuals; online “fatwa to kill a disbelieving American, European or Australian” has changed the dynamics and security environment. Such fatwas have occurred in Melbourne and Sydney and in other western cities.
We need a different all-inclusive fully-integrated model, incorporating time critical human intelligence/information (‘HUMINT’). It should use all available resources, building on police, airport security, CCTV and the Terrorist Hotline public engagement principle, as all employees must have a role. This additional resource – an entire airport workforce – will greatly assist in mitigating the risk and provide early warning of any potential incident, suspect people or unusual activities. It means ‘more eyes and ears on the ground’, to detect, disrupt and provide early warnings to save lives.
Our new measure must be resilient in the face of worldwide radicalization of individuals or groups and terrorist endeavours. These measures will address multinational crime or other illegal activities, which may also provide financial support or resources to satisfy various fatwas, create fear and threaten our lifestyle and beliefs. It is well known weapons and drugs transit airports.
We should keep in mind the PM’s recent statement on 4 January 2015 – “the death cult in Iraq has declared war against the world”. Just as our ADF is totally engaged, we should apply the same fully integrated methodology and approach to our homeland, public places, ‘places of mass gathering’ and critical infrastructures such as airports. Just as “stop the boats” campaign was a success, airports need a new all-inclusive approach to security.
Our political system often acts as an enabler for those wishing to cause harm, disrupt, commit crime and so we need a new paradigm and enhanced focused total political/policy engagement with our approach for the environment.
Additional spending on national security will top $1.3 billion over the next four years. Government has a responsibility to use these funds to provide maximum, safety and security for its people using all assets. Presently gaps exist in the safety and security model.
Bold, decisive and different solutions are now required from Government and the case for change to our current methodology and approach to safety and security is overwhelming.
Disruption caused by terrorism and the fear it creates must be prevented and stopped by putting enhanced measures in place.
SUMMARY OF HSAP RECOMMENDATIONS:
- Need to engage the entire workforce on an Airport. Missing component – A1A ‘HUMINT’ system.
- Legislate public safety and security training on airports.
- Culvert, pits, water drains to secure airport perimeter fences.
- Annual CT Exercises and auditing.
- Legislate fines for failing to carry out CT exercises on airports.
- Terrorist Hot Line number – front page of daily newspapers.
- Review expenditure and need for new AFP command centres.
- Identification, Control Orders and Insider Threat measures.
- CCTV systems on airports – three months retention of recordings.
- Failure of companies to provide adequate safety and security.
- Issues regarding VIP lounges.
- Taxi ranks at Terminals and vetting needs.
- Random bag searches.
- Pilot training applicants to undergo extensive checks
- IT Security on Airports and for Air traffic.
IMPORTANT: The Inquiry panel should consider not releasing findings or recommendations from this inquiry that may be used by terrorists, extremists or others planning to target Airports .This includes air cargo centres, or travel through airports, where they may cause harm, disruption or conduct unlawful activities. The release of such new measures may prejudice the safety and security of others.
CURRENT SITUATION FOR AIRPORTS
Airports remain ‘sitting ducks’ for Australia’s home-grown terrorists!
We can learn from the past. Sir Henry Parkes in 1889, declared at his Federation speech “One Nation – One People”. In 2015 we need to be bold and have one inclusive approach for one application, one methodology.
An innovative new approach must replace existing dated measures to safeguard the nation. This is at a time when marginalised, radicalized Australians refuse to accept Australian law, try to divide; ignore compliance obligations and attack the social fabric of what Federation achieved – “One People – One Nation”.
The urgent need is to unite and engage all Australians in protecting the total population, our way of life, belief in a fair go for all and protection of tax payer funded critical infrastructure worth billions of dollars. This is our Australia.
New Australian-developed public safety and security awareness methodology will provide prior warning by covering a total precinct, such as an airport.
Community engagement can be achieved rapidly and cost effectively, to put an end to reliance on the existing stovepipe security methodology and technology, which consists of tools – which never constitute a total solution.
Globally acclaimed, Australian counter insurgency expert and advisor to US President Obama, US DHS and the CIA, David Kilcullen, warned late in 2014; a terrorist attack on Australia was a 100 per cent certainty. This has now happened!
The recent, totally avoidable, ISIS-inspired, fatal Lindt café siege in Martin Place, which followed shortly after this blunt wakeup call, is likely to be a precursor to better organised, much more deadly and destructive ‘lone wolf’ attacks.
It is on the public record Australia’s intelligence agencies the AFP and State Police are attempting to monitor such people daily, with their limited resources. As well trained and professional as they are, they can never address the growing threat without workplace and public support.
All designated ‘Places of Mass Gathering’ requiring additional security remain vulnerable, including airports, seaports, bus and rail terminals, sporting arenas and Houses of Parliament.
Airports are prime soft targets for terrorists. Documents recovered after the elimination of Osama bin Laden, in Pakistan, now in the possession of the CIA, include a hand written DIY manual on infiltrating and bombing airports. Osama spelt out how to identify, recruit, radicalise, train and deploy an airport employee as a suicide bomber (The insider threat is real). These documents are available to terrorists and others
On 12 January 2015 AL-Qaeda magazine “Inspire” outlined how to make a bomb from household goods, without using metal components, which would allow it to show up in the airport security checks. The publication also shows where to place a bomb on a plane and how to detonate it to cause maximum damage.
Australian airports are vulnerable to a mass-casualty terrorist attack, because they all rely on a response to incidents and lack proactive Human intelligence intervention (‘HUMINT’). ‘HUMINT’ can dramatically enhance public safety and security on airports and for other designated ‘Places of Mass Gathering’. It was an alert woman who called in her concerns, about the ‘Fake Sheikh’ in Martin Place, to police. Her ‘HUMINT’ act saved lives! This factor is the missing application in the Government’s measures addressing safety and security on all precincts.
Australia’s lack of public safety preparedness and protocols was obvious during the Martin Place siege. Spectators were permitted to stand unprotected from bullets, shotgun pellets, splintered glass and the possibility of falling masonry behind pedestrian barriers. The area should have been evacuated.
Hundreds could easily die unnecessarily in an undetectable suicide plastic, or household bomb, or toothpaste bomb attack, on an Australian airport. The 300,000- strong national airport workforce remains untrained in public safety and security awareness. This potential civilian workforce ‘army’ is vastly bigger than the combined AFP and ADF resources of less than100, 000 uniformed, frontline personnel. Some Australian police forces realise the benefits of engagement of the public and have volunteers helping police stations. Why rely on a handful, when millions of Australian would like to know how to contribute to National Security; as we all have a role.
A paradigm shift is urgently required to provide forewarning of threats, at a time of high alert, to assist the AFP and ASIO – particularly in identifying the ‘intent and capability’ of known Islamic extremists.
According to the 9/11 inquiry, this mass casualty, multi-strike terrorist attack was avoidable and occurred due to an intelligence failure caused by a lack of interoperability and co-operation between US agencies.
Highly skilled Australian Federal and State agencies work as one, after years of preparation created an integrated approach to National Security, ahead of the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Hundreds of volunteers helped make the event safe and secure, with ‘more eyes and ears on the ground’.
There is an urgent need to change parliamentarian and public perception airports are safe havens, when in reality they are high risk precincts and designated ‘places of mass gatherings’ of thousands of people. No law enforcement agency in the world can guarantee to protect such numbers of people. A fresh strategic approach is now needed.
Everyone working on an airport and the travelling public has a role to play in identifying and mitigating risk.
RECOMMENDATION: Replace naivety with reality, by taking immediate steps to reduce reliance on restricted security methodology and technology. Unite, educate and engage the entire workforce population in a program to protect people, infrastructure and our way of life, especially for ‘places of mass gatherings’. This approach can start with airport workers.
THE MISSING COMPONENT – A1A ‘HUMINT’ SYSTEM
United Nations ICAO-compliant AVSEC-1-ALERTTM (A1A) ‘HUMINT’ (Human Intelligence/Intervention) public safety and security awareness system, developed in Australia by HSAP is now available and can be used to train an entire airport workforce – airside and landside.
A1A is designed to transform a largely disparate workforce, into a trained, cohesive, public safety and security aware ‘airport community’. This holistic, fully integrated system empowers anyone working on an airport precinct to act and immediately report anything unusual, suspicious, dangerous, or criminal. More eyes and ears!
Qualifications are a mandatory condition of employment, when candidates apply for most jobs, yet thousands work on airports with no idea how to report anything suspicious or unusual, let alone deal with an emergency, crisis or catastrophe.
Cost effective A1A training is available face-to-face for $300 per ASIO-cleared ASIC holder, or $250 securely online 24/7 in many languages, from Melbourne headquartered, award-winning national RTO, Complex Institute of Education. Discounts apply for volume bookings. Complex has national and international reach and more than 30 years security training experience, including thousands for the Melbourne Commonwealth Games.
The Office of Transport Security (OTS), within the Department of Infrastructure, has agreed to permit Complex Institute of Education, fold A1A into its new CERT 11, for airport staff, with designated airport security responsibilities. A1A is all inclusive and should not be confined to a handful of workers on an airport. A1A is deliberately simple, in complete contrast to OTS programs which are structured, formal and stovepipe. Cleaners see everything are overlooked sources of information
A1A training would not be a burden on the Federal budget or airport owners although government may wish to allocate funds for training under the new CT initiatives, to enable early introduction of ‘HUMINT’ on airports.
A1A is a user-pay system, which enables any employer to commit existing, compulsory training budgets or EBA’s, to train every airport worker. A1A was first deployed on LINFOX-owned Avalon Airport. Negotiations are underway on several Australian airports and in the USA
Watch the A1A Training Clip Above
India has started training its massive airport workforce in public safety and security awareness. PRC negotiations will resume in the first quarter of 2015, with a J/V college established by Complex Institute of Education, in Beijing, capable of training 100,000 candidates at a time.
Homeland Security Asia/Pacific (HSAP) – is the only organization totally committed to changing the ‘security culture’ on airports and other designated ‘places of mass gathering!’
HSAP incorporated this Senate Inquiry information into the development of the A1A ‘HUMINT’ system and has trained the trainers. Distribution and A1A program delivery is the responsibility of Master Licensee and award winning Registered Training Organisation (RTO), Complex Institute of Education.
A1A enhanced measures must now be applied to ensure the safety and security of each airport workforce, airline crews, passengers and visitors. Everyone has a role.
HSAP aims are to:
- Protect the lives of airport workforces/crews/ millions of passengers/visitors;
- Protect around $50 billion in critical infrastructure of vital importance to National Security, in Australia
- Mitigate disruption and risk of closure of any major airport, which would cost the Australian economy $1-billion-a-week (see attached Industry Impact Statement)
- Expand ‘HUMINT’ awareness to save lives overseas
- Grow train-the-trainer programs
- Reduce fear of terrorism, by increasing public involvement in ‘HUMINT”.
RECOMMENDATION: Legislate mandatory, national, public safety and security awareness training at employer expense for anyone working on an Australian airport precinct (airside and landside) or a supporting industry.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
Recent media reports on apparent breaches in airport and aviation security at Australia airports
HSAP was the reluctant source of still shots taken of breaches at (1) Melbourne Tullamarine Airport – 2013 (2) Canberra Airport – 2013; (3) Video footage of easy airside access to Sydney Airport – 2014 (4) Video footage of 2014 UK toothpaste bomb experiments exposed on the Seven Network, by Bryan Seymour.
All evidence of breaches was emailed by HSAP direct to DPM and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development, Warren Truss, as it was discovered, since the election of the Abbott Coalition Government.
Mr Truss has never responded to this disturbing material, or rectified any of the breaches over a 14 month period – but sources within his Department of Infrastructure advised HSAP the still and video evidence ‘caused a stir’.
Mr Truss received the video footage of UK tooth paste bomb experiments, three days before Intelligence agencies caught up with this essential R & D work.
HSAP has been a regular commentator on airport and airline security on the Seven Network and Sky’s ‘Paul Murray Live’; CNN, ABC, SBS TEN and Nine; numerous newspapers/magazines/online sites, including talk back shows, here and abroad.
Consideration of responses to those reports from the Government, regulators, airports and key stakeholders and the adequacy of those responses
All direct emails to the DPM were ignored by Mr Truss and the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. No follow up, or action was taken to rectify known breaches, indicating ignorance, indifference, a complete lack of concern for duty of care responsibilities and inability to respond or take action.
At the request of Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop; a letter on behalf of the Attorney General, George Brandis QC, dated 10 December 2014, was received by HSAP on 15 December 2014. This related to HSAP’s G20 aviation security recommendations made on 20 January 2014! The letter, missed the point completely and merely listed Australia’s security affiliations. It was totally inadequate. (HSAP took separate action to make its G20 submission available direct to US CT experts, prior to the Summit, after zero response from DPM Truss or AG Brandis).
No interest was expressed by the Australian Airports Association (AAA) whose members reportedly ceased reporting breaches, after Seven Network’s Bryan Seymour revealed 300 security breaches in 2014, ahead of this Senate Inquiry.
Some airport owners have said ‘we’ll only do what is compulsory’. Compliance and auditing of measures is non-existent in many areas of the airport/airline industry, to the utter frustration of loyal, dedicated, hardworking staff at the Department of Infrastructure.
The last Labour Minister for Infrastructure, Anthony Albanese, burdened many smaller airports, owned by local councils with expensive scanners, but did not fund compliance visits by Office of Transport Security specialists. It is still possible to put an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) on an aircraft as air cargo, at a regional or rural airport, to be detonated on approach to/or over a capital city airport, or transhipped and uploaded to an international flight.
Whether there are further measures that ought to be taken to enhance airport security and safety of the travelling public
Walk into any Australian airport and it becomes immediately obvious all security is stovepipe and few know what to do in a crisis, let alone a disaster, yet a mitigation alternative is available and can make a massive, immediate difference.
Airports have been able to ignore duty of care obligations for decades and only do the bare minimum to conform to outdated perimeter fencing originally designed to keep kangaroos, horses and cattle – not terrorists – off runways.
RECOMMENDATION: culverts, gravel pits, water drains or thick bushes/plants should be installed, alongside perimeter fencing on major airports, to prevent a vehicle from crashing through fences onto the airside of airports. CCTV should also cover the fence line using hot screen technology.
Former CEO of the Australian Airports Association, Ken Keech, had decades of airline operational experience, before he retired in 2010. He told HSAP, “We all walk past this stuff (risks) every day, because they are so familiar to us), when given a copy of the draft A1A system in 2010. His successor, a professional administrator has simply resisted the opportunity to improve security.
PRIORITY ACTION REQUIRED – CT EXERCISES
The need for regular CT exercises is important to assess response and capabilities. It is vital to have regular reviews of security capabilities and measures; and for auditing of such to be undertaken on all airports each year; and especially after new builds or construction. This must include a review of perimeter fencing on all capital city and major regional airports. Legislate for everyone working on an airport to undergo mandatory public safety and security awareness training and custodial sentences for executives who fail to carry out Government regulations relating to terminal evacuation exercises.
RECOMMENDATION: Annual audits of airport safety and security measures to be conducted. Exercises to be held annually, regarding the evacuation of airport terminals and response capability and effectiveness of response forces. These exercises should be held in different stages; (1) hold Desk Top exercises to practice callout and management and communication lines; (2) Response Exercise- partial evacuation to monitor communications, coordination and time frames and availability of required resources and (3) a full, annual, counter terrorist exercise over two days including media roles and coronial requirements. Funding should be provided for these exercises.
MANDATORY AIRPORT EVACUATION EXERCISES
Major airports have been able to ignore Federal Government requirements to perform total evacuation exercises at least once a year; in line with mandatory evacuation exercises undertaken at Government facilities.
RECOMMENDATION: Legislate under the Terrorism Act, heavy fines and custodial sentences for executives responsible for failing to carry out mandated full scale airport evacuation exercises, coupled with necessary audits of effectiveness and existing training compliance for safety and security.
TERRORIST HOT LINE EXPOSURE IN MEDIA- PUBLIC AWARENESS
It is vital all Australians know and/or have access to this hotline number and for it to be displayed in places of work. This is all part of public engagement in the reporting process of suspicious activities or unusual events. We all have a role in public safety and security. This is a recommendation in HSAP’s A1A training package. This number is placed within newspapers irregularly but not on front pages.
RECOMMENDATION: The National Security Hot Line Number 1800 123 400 to be placed on the front page of all daily newspapers, top right hand corner in a SMALL cut out box, encouraging readers to cut the number out and place it in a wallet, handbag, near a workplace telephone, on the fridge and entered into all mobile phones, ready for use.
AFP COMMAND CENTRES FUNDING
The current Abbott Government policy of allocating hundreds of millions of dollars to buy more technology and finance additional AFP activity is a repeat of the Rudd/Gillard/Rudd ‘big dollar’ initiatives. This knee jerk spending is used as a fast political fix, aimed at convincing voters action has been taken, during a Government drought of new initiatives and to maximise ‘positive’ media coverage.
The Gillard Government established AFP command centres on Canberra airport, (which has limited flights) and Brisbane airport, at a cost of $25 million each. Labor Minister for Infrastructure, Anthony Albanese planned to roll out more AFP centres at $25 million each, on all other capital city airports, in the misguided belief more police and guns are the solution to terrorism.
RECOMMENDATION: Assistant Treasurer, Josh Freudenberg, revisit AFP funding and viability/justification for building more AFP airport command centres.
IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTATION, CONTROL ORDER, INSIDER THREAT
To assist with identification confirmation of people at airports, including arriving and departing passengers, it is important not to rely on just one form of identification being used, e.g. passports. Other documentation is needed to avoid unlawful activity.
RECOMMENDATION: Police on airports, and/or airport security staff should be authorised to seek two forms of identification from people at airports. One being a passport and the second either a driver’s licence or other photo ID. If this is not possible other documents could be used which match the name and photo on, the passport, with the person being questioned.
Police should be able to ask any person on an airport offering a driver’s license as ID, for the the registration number of the vehicle they arrived in and/or a description of the vehicle they travelled in. Signs should be installed at airports advising this action may occur.
People passing through Customs and Immigration should be able to show two forms of photo identification.
Control Orders should include statements restricting unauthorised suspicious/persons of interest, from visiting defined places such as airports, r making it obligatory for them to consult and advise police of their intentions.
Insider Threat! Police should be authorised to conduct random ACIS pass holder checks, to confirm the identity of anyone in possession of one, on any airport.
CCTV SYSTEMS AT AIRPORTS AND IN ADJOINING CAR PARKS
History shows most terrorists, even a ‘lone wolf’ attacker will conduct one or two reconnaissance missions, to assess a target, some time prior to an event or incident. This planning enables them to maximise the impact and disruption they intend to cause and may enable them to plan an exist route. It is known police seek and use CCTV footage to address prior activities leading up to an event and also in coronial investigations. This information often assists in identifying other persons who may also have been involved in the preplanning stage, of a terrorist attack.
RECOMMENDATION: The hard drive and recording capabilities of all major airport CCTV systems, (especially airside), be enlarged to enable three months storage of recorded history, before being over written.
EXPERT CONDEMNATION OF DEPENDENCE ON TECHNOLOGY:
More technology sounds good and acts as a placebo, providing the public with a false sense of security! However, technology only ever consists of a variety of tools dependent on humans to guide performance towards optimum capability. Technology is most useful during a catastrophic event and/or for the ensuing coronial investigation – but is never a mitigation miracle.
Two of America’s top counter terrorism experts, John Miller, ex NYPD, LAPD and US Office of National Security Intelligence (CIA) and Tomer Benito, ex Israeli Special Forces, are vocal critics of heavy dependence on technology.
Exclusive video interviews, by Australian security media guru, Chris Cubbage, with John Miller and Tomer Benito can be accessed on his ‘Australian Security News’ website. Perth based, Chris Cubbage is highly respected in law enforcement and intelligence circles and previously with WA Police, the Australian Crime Commission and Edith Cowan University.
HSAP has financed and invested seven years into the R & D needed to deliver a world first system to help protect everyone ‘landside’ on airports, from cleaners, to airport/airline staff, foreign exchange tellers, to car rental clerks and fast food workers. Cleaners observe more happenings than anyone else on an airport.
All airport ‘airside’ workers, from ramp operators and baggage handlers, to refuelers, caterers, tug drivers, engineers and air traffic controllers are at high risk because of the nature of their work. They are acutely aware ASIC pass abuse, is a daily occurrence, enabling unauthorised people access to the tarmac and maintenance. They all need to be trained in how to identify risks. The HSAP A1A training package is ready to be rolled out Australia wide.
COMMENTS FROM AIRPORT STAFF – INTRODUCTION TO AVSEC-1-ALERT
Complex Institute of Education, the bench mark in airport public safety and security training, can demonstrate an introduction to the A1A system during the Inquiry hearings, or at its Melbourne CBD headquarters.
Qantas and Virgin Airline candidates were shocked and angry when exposed during A1A system training, to risks they never knew existed at MEL/SYD airports. They asked “how come we didn’t know this information”?
DEFINING RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRPORT SECURITY
Since privatisation, airport owners have relied on securing a Federal Government bailout, should a crisis or catastrophe occur on any Australian airport. A financial rescue may happen if disaster strikes, but airport owners will almost certainly be billed back, by the Federal Government for the cost of dealing with a major crisis.
The US Government has statutory limitations on when financial assistance can be provided to facilities which experience major terrorist attacks. Airport owners need to be made aware they have responsibility to ensure best practice for safety and security on airports.
Australian airport critical infrastructure worth in the region of $50-billion is unprotected from terrorist attack or malicious acts. The Federal Government is well aware closure of any capital city airport, following a serious or mass casualty event, would cost the economy one billion dollars a week.
RECOMMENDATION: Legislate heavy fines and mandatory custodial sentences for anyone or company failing to meet duty of care obligations on airports and/or responsible for providing adequate safety and security to protect people and airport critical infrastructure.
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SLACK ‘SECURITY CULTURE’
HSAP can demonstrate to the Inquiry video footage of airline staff ‘piggy backing’ into secure areas, which is rampant practice on Australian airports and an example of slack ‘security culture’ which is unmonitored; unaudited and requiring further ongoing workforce training.
HSAP can show the Inquiry footage of a four-shot mobile phone, which by-passes security scanners. Other concealable items which can also make it into airports, Parliament House, Canberra and other designated ‘Places of Mass Gathering’ critical infrastructure sites, can be revealed.
PARLIAMENTARIANS AT HIGH RISK IN VIP AIRLINE LOUNGES
Parliamentarians seem to be oblivious to the many risks associated with VIP invitation-only airline lounges, which are high value soft targets for terrorists, or the deranged and easily accessed facilities aka ‘listening posts’. Politicians are isolated by red carpet treatment and are not exposed to normal, terminal activity. VIP lounges create the same false sense of security for Parliamentarians, as is the norm, on entering Parliament House Canberra. All guests should memorize the location of exits and develop an alternate evacuation strategy. AFP presence on airports is designed to establish a ‘perception of security’; and will not deter a calm, suicide bomber. There is no immunity from terrorism.
RECOMMENDATION: Advise Federal and State Parliamentarians to exercise extreme caution when using VIP invitation-only airline lounges, which are not safe havens from terrorists or hostage takers.
Plastic explosives remain undetectable and can bypass airport scanners, or consigned as freight. Scientists are working non-stop to find a solution. HSAP can show the Inquiry footage of ‘toothpaste’ bomb experiments used to blow up a car in the UK, carried out by specialist bomb expert colleagues. IED’s can be placed in aircraft holds, under seats of unattended aircraft, in air-cargo satchels or, carried on a flight by a passenger. The front page warning in the Australian on Monday 12 January 2015, which stated: “Europe braces for new wave of terror attacks”, should garner the interest of Federal Cabinet Ministers
AIRPORT TERMINALS – TAXI SUICIDE BOMBS
As many as 12-14 men rent and drive on one taxi authority. Most are from South Asian and African nations. During 9/11 Muslim taxi drivers on Sydney airport ranks, were videotaped punching the air and cheering. They are still here and with others constitute a serious risk, as it is simple to convert a taxi into a suicide bomb and drive it into a terminal.
RECOMMENDATION: Taxi ranks should be removed from the front of airport terminals and entrance doors. Install demountable bollards to prevent vehicle access to terminals. Introduce ASIC style ASIO vetting and ID cards to all capital city taxi drivers who frequent the main airports. .
Undertake regular, random, joint Police/Centrelink/Transport Authority raids on taxi holding yards prior to peak flight arrivals. Strip licences and Centrelink cards from drivers illegally behind the wheel of a cab. Introduce tough mandatory penalties for offenders
FLAWS IN ELECTRONIC PROFILING AT SYD/MEL AIRPORTS
The appointment of a total of 80 Counter Terrorism Officers (Profilers) at SYD/MEL Airports, has resulted in the identification of a few high risk passengers and some were prevented from flying out of Australia, to fight in Syria and Iraq. Twenty to forty Australians have already returned from this region.
Not all Islamic extremists fit the stereotype culling, used to single out bearded men of Middle Eastern appearance. The clean shaven, red haired, Western Sydney teenager, who ended up denouncing Australia in ISIS propaganda videos, uploaded on social media from Syria, would probably have been missed by profiling technology.
A total of 80 profilers, when broken down into two shifts a day at MEL/SYD, translates to a maximum of 20 on duty at a time on either airport and less, when rostered days off, sick days and holidays are factored in. This additional resource is a tool, not a solution. We must never forget people wishing to cause harm; plan and often conduct recognisance missions of an area, prior to an attack. Weapons are easily obtained on the streets for a fee. Resources are available to terrorists. The threat is real as terrorists now have the intent and the capability to strike.
RANDOM BAG SEARCHES AND IDENTIFICATION AT AIRPORTS
On 13 January 2015 the US Department of Homeland Security announced a review of new anti-terror measures in response to recent attacks in Paris. These include increased security at airports including random bag searches. Biometric facial recognition technology can only match an uncovered face with mugshots on watch lists.
RECOMMENDATION: Police be empowered to conduct random bag searches on airports. Signs to be installed notifying passengers and visitors motorcycle helmets, balaclavas or facial covering are not permitted in airport terminals.
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH VIRTUAL FLIGHT TRAINING PACKAGES
Anyone can learn the basics of flying a commercial airliner, using a $50 virtual flight training computer package. Thousands do this daily as a hobby to familiarise themselves with cockpit and flight procedures. HSAP can demonstrate to this Senate Inquiry a Dash-8 virtual dual attack on Sydney Tower and the Sydney Opera House. It takes just two minutes and 14 switches to get a fully refuelled Dash-8, rolling from a Qantas holding area, known as the pond, at Sydney Airport, onto a taxiway for take-off on a suicide mission, which would incinerate five city blocks.
Threats have been made in the past to fly a Dash-8 into the MCG on Grand Final day. Refuelled Dash-8 and other commuter aircraft sit, often unlocked and unguarded overnight on regional airports Australia-wide. These include Wide Bay, Queensland, local airport for DPM Warren Truss; and Tamworth, NSW, home airport for his fellow Minister, Barnaby Joyce.
RECOMMENDATION: All applicants for pilot training in Australia should be required to undergo annual Police, ASIO, mental health checks, submit a medical report and provide the Police with two signed character references.
IT SECUIRTY ON AIRPORTS AND FOR AIRTRAFFIC
As we are well aware, denial of service attacks do occur on major infrastructure facilities. It is important computer security on all critical control and communications systems used with regard to aircraft management on all airports especially Australia’s main airports, must be audited annually.
RECOMMENDATION: Updating of all firewalls on airport and air traffic systems. Annual change of all passwords including access doors.
When staff resign or leave – all relevant passwords need to be changed and building keys, swipe cards returned on departure.
Prevention is far more cost effective than incident response. It covers all impacts – loss of life, political, economic/GDP, social, replacements, investigations and Royal Commissions.
If the Martin Place fatal siege, in December 2014, is designated an act of terrorism, insurers will need to address responsibility, liability and compensation, with the Federal Government, which can treat terrorism differently to other claims.
When a major incident, catastrophe or mass casualty attack occurs on an airport, liability will be the responsibility of the private owners/operators – not the Federal Government, as widely misunderstood by most in the airport/aviation sector.
The immediate priority of an insurer will be to establish blame/responsibility and whether or not all ‘known’ security measures were in place, on an airport.
Currently, airports face the possibility of insurance policies being negated, if they have not done all possible to mitigate risk to lives, infrastructure and airline fleets, as first advised to the Australian Airports Association in 2010.
HSAP is a field operations and strategic planning organisation. Its five key Australian decision makers have accrued more than 120 years of collective experience in the security/intelligence, law enforcement, crisis management/CRISISCOM, public safety, aviation and security training sectors. They are frequently called upon for comment as experts in their fields, by the Australian media, CNN and other credible news services.
Findings of, and responses to, reports undertaken into airport security issues since 2000
2005 WHEELER INQUIRY
Many of the three-year Wheeler Inquiry recommendations were never implemented by the Howard/Rudd/Gillard/Rudd/Abbott Governments and are now nine years old.
When HSAP Director of Strategic Alliances, Michael Roach, introduced himself to DPM Warren Truss, on the Sunshine Coast in 2014 to explain the benefits of A1A, Mr Truss switched the conversation to his role in the 2005 Wheeler Inquiry.
The DPM did not grasp the difference between physical security recommendations made in the Wheeler Inquiry and ‘HUMINT’ capabilities.
2012 SENATE RURAL & REGIONAL AFFAIRS & TRANSPORT LEGISLATION COMMITTEE – AVIATION TRANSPORT SECURITY (SCREENING) BILL 2012 PROVISIONS
A number of HSAP security recommendations submitted to this earlier Senate Inquiry were adopted in the Report, but not implemented on airports.
The Federal Government is virtually out of time to legislate to provide hefty penalties for airports/airlines, which fail to adhere to public safety and security requirements and breaches of duty of care responsibilities.
Australia’s counter-insurgency expert and advisor to US President Barack Obama, US DHS and CIA, David Kilcullen, recently warned on the Seven Network, a terrorist attack on Australian soil, was a 100 per cent certainty. This has occurred.
Sadly, the Lindt chocolate café tragedy is likely to be a precursor to something far better planned and likely to be much more deadly and destructive. A raid by gun men as occurred in Paris on 7 January 2015, is just one example, of what the West can expect. The fact, as stated in the Australia on 12 January 2015, Police are now monitoring 15 people of interest, just in Sydney.
Australia’s hefty reliance on technology and a tactical response capability is not enough to mitigate risk on airports and other designated ‘Places of Mass Gathering”. One missing component is ‘HUMINT’, engagement of all who work on airports. The window of opportunity to plug major holes in airport security and train and engage the national airport workforce is almost over.
Our Founder of the Federation’s catchcry needs to be reapplied; One Nation One People, to create one fully engaged strategy, using all existing resources, for one total effective solution to protect the public.
Threat is defined as intent and capability. Those wishing to cause us fear, harm, or disrupt our way of life now have the commitment and resources to succeed. The Government must increase its resolve and capability to enhance safety and security for its people.
HSAP – AVSEC-1-ALERT SPECIALIST TEAM – 2015 SENATE INQUIRY HEARING INTO AVIATION SECURITY
ROGER HENNING – Founder and CEO of Homeland Security Asia/Pacific Pty Ltd co-developed A1A with HSAP Director of Strategic Alliances, Michael Roach. Roger has been sent on assignment to all of the countries of South and SE-Asia, by the Australian Government. He flew on Air America missions during the Vietnam War; and is a former Information Attaché’, at the Australian Embassy, Washington DC. Roger has high echelon connections in the global security/intelligence sector. His international experience includes crisis management, counter terrorism, commercial aviation and protection of critical infrastructure across many industries. Roger introduced biometric facial recognition technology across Asia/Pacific, capable of matching a million mug shots a second, deployed at major airports. He has been involved in the aftermath of more than 50 major incidents worldwide, including terrorist bombings in the UK, India and Philippines. Roger was the Crisis Manager flown into Port Arthur, Tasmania, before gunman Martin Bryant was apprehended.
MICHAEL ROACH – HSAP Director of Strategic Alliances is a strategic risk consultant to industry and co-developer of A1A with Roger Henning. Michael served 33 years as an Australian Government Officer, with responsibility for protecting critical infrastructure and places of mass gatherings. Michael’s extensive expertise includes airport, transport and port security, risk threat assessments and reviews, senior crisis management at a National Level, protective security and response. Michael has worked on Counter Terrorism across all Government and key industry infrastructure areas in Australia and overseas. His specialties are: systemic vulnerability identification; integrated security design measures; infrastructure and whole of industry protection, security awareness training, operational mitigation and security build strategies and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design. His expertise includes application and coordination of protective, IT and physical security measures relevant to emerging threats and more recently consultation to EU on CBRNE Supply Chain. He has lectured and delivered training on security in Australia and S.E. Asia.
DR TONY ZALEWSKI – Highly regarded worldwide as a public safety expert, Tony was a decorated VICPOL officer for 17 years. Tony established the multi award-winning Australian Institute of Public Safety (RTO) and developed a range of vocational courses and higher education degrees. He contributed his unique public safety experience to the development of A1A. Tony has four degrees including law, criminology and the social sciences. His PhD was on systems of security and he applies his knowledge across industry sectors locally and abroad including aviation. He has vast experience in public safety risk mitigation; is often called as an expert witness in major court cases and is in demand on the global speaker circuit. He has exceptional top level connections in international law enforcement, aviation security, airport management and critical infrastructure protection. He has long term consulting relationships across Asia and the Pacific regions. Tony has provided public safety services in every Australian State and Territory and many other countries.
ANDREW SHEA – CEO of award-winning Complex Institute of Education (CIE), Andrew leads the resource development and compliance teams as a highly qualified Australian training industry professional. He has overall management responsibility for 175 staff; and delegating supervision of product development and quality assurance and mapping of modules to meet Government requirements. CIE is a specialised and long established Registered Training Organisation which has invested significantly in the creation of a secure e-learning platform, to be utilised for the delivery of A1A. CIE is registered nationally and can deliver A1A Australia wide. CIE has trained over 30,000 students in Nationally Accredited Qualifications with around 6000 security personnel trained in preparation for the Melbourne Commonwealth Games. As well as extensive delivery experience in Australia CIE delivers training in both India and the PRC and is responsible for the licensing and delivery of A1A. The qualifications delivered by CIE meet regulatory requirements by both educational regulators and for Aviation Security qualifications, bodies such as the Office of Transport Protection. CIE has the demonstrated capacity to deliver A1A via a range of modes including face-to-face, a blended face-to-face and eLearning mode or securely via CIE’s secure e-learning portal.